Adapting the DMTCP Plugin Model for Checkpointing of Hardware Emulation by Garg, Rohan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
00
89
7v
1 
 [c
s.O
S]
  2
 M
ar 
20
17
Adapting the DMTCP Plugin Model for Checkpointing of Hardware Emulation†
Rohan Garg∗
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
Email: rohgarg@ccs.neu.edu
Kapil Arya
Mesosphere, Inc.
San Francisco, CA
Email: kapil@mesosphere.io
Jiajun Cao∗
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
Email: jiajun@ccs.neu.edu
Gene Cooperman∗
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
Email: gene@ccs.neu.edu
Jeff Evans
Mentor Graphics Corp.
Austin, TX
Email: jeff_evans@mentor.com
Ankit Garg
Mentor Graphics Corp.
NOIDA / India
Email: Ankit_Garg@mentor.com
Neil A. Rosenberg
Intel Corporation
Austin, TX
Email: neil.a.rosenberg@intel.com
K. Suresh
Mentor Graphics Corp.
NOIDA / India
Email: K_Suresh@mentor.com
Abstract—Checkpoint-restart is now a mature technology. It
allows a user to save and later restore the state of a running
process. The new plugin model for the upcoming version 3.0 of
DMTCP (Distributed MultiThreaded Checkpointing) is described
here. This plugin model allows a target application to disconnect
from the hardware emulator at checkpoint time and then re-
connect to a possibly different hardware emulator at the time of
restart. The DMTCP plugin model is important in allowing three
distinct parties to seamlessly inter-operate. The three parties are:
the EDA designer, who is concerned with formal verification of
a circuit design; the DMTCP developers, who are concerned
with providing transparent checkpointing during the circuit
emulation; and the hardware emulator vendor, who provides a
plugin library that responds to checkpoint, restart, and other
events.
The new plugin model is an example of process-level virtualiza-
tion: virtualization of external abstractions from within a process.
This capability is motivated by scenarios for testing circuit
models with the help of a hardware emulator. The plugin model
enables a three-way collaboration: allowing a circuit designer
and emulator vendor to each contribute separate proprietary
plugins while sharing an open source software framework from
the DMTCP developers. This provides a more flexible platform,
where different fault injection models based on plugins can be
designed within the DMTCP checkpointing framework. After
initialization, one restarts from a checkpointed state under the
control of the desired plugin. This restart saves the time spent in
simulating the initialization phase, while enabling fault injection
exactly at the region of interest. Upon restart, one can inject
faults or otherwise modify the remainder of the simulation. The
work concludes with a brief survey of the existing approaches to
checkpointing and to process-level virtualization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Checkpoint-restart is now a mature technology with a va-
riety of robust packages [1], [2], [3]. This work concentrates
on the DMTCP (Distributed MultiThreaded CheckPointing)
package and its sophisticated plugin model that enables pro-
cess virtualization [4]. This plugin model has been used re-
cently to demonstrate checkpointing of 32,752 MPI processes
on a supercomputer at TACC (Texas Advanced Computing
Center) [5]. DMTCP itself is free and open source. The
DMTCP publications page [6] lists approximately 50 refereed
∗ This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grant ACI-1440788.
†SELSE ’17, March 21–22, 2017, Boston, MA, USA
publications by external groups that have used DMTCP in their
work.
This work concentrates on the recent advances in the
DMTCP programming model that were motivated by work
with Intel Corporation. While Intel works with multiple ven-
dors of hardware emulators, this work reflects the three-way
collaboration between the DMTCP team, Intel, and Mentor
Graphics, a vendor of hardware emulators for EDA. Further
information specific to EDA (Electronic Design Automation)
is contained in [7]. In particular, the ability to save the state
of a simulation including the state of a back-end hardware
emulator is a key to using checkpoint-restart in EDA.
For background on how DMTCP is used generally at Intel,
see [8]. The focuses of the ongoing work at Intel is best
described by their statement of future work:
“Within Intel IT, we will focus on the development
and enhancement of the DMTCP technology for use
with graphical EDA tools, with strong network de-
pendencies. . . . There is also additional engagement
with third-party vendors to include native DMTCP
support in their tools, as well as engagement with
super-computing development teams on enabling
DMTCP for the Xeon Phi family of products.”
A hardware emulator may entail a thousand-fold slowdown,
as compared to direct execution in silicon. There are two
natural use cases of checkpointing in the context of EDA.
In both cases, the natural strategy is to run until reaching
the region of logic of interest. Then checkpoint. Later, one
can repeatedly restart and test the logic, without worrying
about the long initialization times under a hardware emulator.
Restarting under DMTCP is extremely fast, especially when
the -fast-restart flag is used that takes advantage of mmap()
to load pages into memory on-demand at runtime (after the
initial restart). The two use cases follow.
Testing of silicon logic: run until reaching the logic to be
tested; then repeatedly restart and follow different logic
branches; and
Fault injection in silicon logic: run until reaching the logic
to be tested; then repeatedly restart, inject faults in the
emulated (or simulated) silicon model and run along a
pre-determined logic branch to determine the level of
fault tolerance for that silicon design.
For this work, the second case is of greater interest. This
requires running arbitrary code either immediately at the
point of restart by injecting faults in the logic design, or by
interposing on later logic functions of the simulator/emulator
so as to inject transient faults.
The first use case above has been extensively studied using
DMTCP in domains as varied as architecture simulation [9],
formal verification of embedded control systems [10], network
simulation [11], and software model checking [12]. While the
two use cases are closely related, this work highlights the
second use case, by including the possibility of interposing
at runtime. Section II presents the tools for such interposition,
including the creation of global barriers at an arbitrary point
in the program. Section III presents three particular extensions
of checkpointing that were added to the DMTCP plugin model
specifically motivated by the concerns observed in our general
collaboration on EDA.
The DMTCP plugin model is critical in this latter applica-
tion. One must stop a computation at a pre-defined location
in the simulation, save additional state information (such as
the state of a hardware emulator being used [7]), and then
inject additional code (such as fault injection) at restart time.
A contribution of the DMTCP plugin model is the ability to
virtualize multiple aspects of the computation. These include:
pathnames (for example, the subdirectory corresponding to the
current “run slot” of the emulator); environment variables (for
example, modification of the DISPLAY environment variable,
or other environment variables intrinsic to the running of the
simulation); interposition of the simulation by a third-party
plugin (for example, for purposes of measuring timings since
restart at multiple levels of granularity, or programmatically
creating additional checkpoints for analysis of interesting
states leading to logic errors); and third-party programmable
barriers across all processes (enabling the acceleration of
simulations through the use of parallel processes and even
distributed processes within a single computation).
The DMTCP plugin model is an example of process virtu-
alization: virtualization of external abstractions from within a
process. It is argued here that the DMTCP plugin model sets
it apart from other checkpointing approaches. To this end, a
brief survey of existing checkpointing approaches and process
virtualization is provided at the end.
In the rest of this paper, Section II motivates the need
for a model of process virtualization with a simple example
concerning process ids. It also reviews the DMTCP plugin
model. Section III presents a series of micro-case studies
in which DMTCP was extended to support the applications
at Intel, along with third-party DMTCP plugins developed
by Mentor Graphics for use by Intel and other customers..
Section IV the provides a survey of DMTCP and some other
related approaches to checkpointing and process virtualization.
Section V then presents the conclusions.
II. USER-SPACE PROCESS VIRTUALIZATION
Application-specific checkpointing and system-level trans-
parent checkpointing are two well-known options for check-
pointing. Unfortunately, neither one fits the requirements for
the proposed use case for simulating fault injection in silicon
logic. Application-specific checkpointing is error-prone and
difficult to maintain. System-level transparent checkpointing
generally does not provide enough control at runtime to
dynamically adjust the type of fault injection. In particular, it
is often necessary to capture control of the target application
dynamically at runtime in order to inject faults. Here we show
how that can be incorporated in a modular DMTCP plugin,
rather than incorporated directly into the simulator/emulator.
For a more thorough introduction to the DMTCP plugin
model, see either [4] or the DMTCP documentation [13]. This
section highlights those aspects most likely to assist in adding
fault injection through a DMTCP plugin.
The primary features of the model of interest for fault
injection are:
1) interposition on function/library calls, and their use in
virtualization;
2) programmatically defined barriers across all processes
on a computer; and
3) programmatically defined choices of when to checkpoint
and when to avoid checkpointing.
A. Process Virtualization through Interposition and Layers: A
Simple Example with Pids
User Process
PID: 4000
User Process
PID: 4001
Virt. PID   Real PID
4000 2652
4001 3120
Translation Table
getpid()26524000
kill(4001, 9) KERNEL
4001
Sending signal 9
to pid 31203120
Fig. 1: Process virtualization for pids.
Figure 1 succintly describes the philosophy of process
virtualization. Some invariant (in this case the pid (process id)
of a process may have a different name prior to checkpoint
and after restart. A virtualized process will interact only with
virtual process ids in the base code. A DMTCP plugin retains
a translation table between the virtualized pid known to the
base code and the real pid known to the kernel.
Since the base code and the kernel interact primarily through
system calls, the DMTCP plugin defines a wrapper function
around that system call. The wrapper function translates be-
tween virtual and real pids both for arguments to the system
call and for the return value. This is illustrated both in Figure 1
and in the example code of Listing 1.
Additionally, pid’s may be passed as part of the proc
filesystem, and through other limited means. To solve this,
WRAPPER int kill(pid_t pid, int sig) {
disable_ckpt();
real_pid = virt_to_real(pid);
int ret = REAL_kill(real_pid, sig);
enable_ckpt();
return ret;
}
✆
Listing 1: A simplified function wrapper for pid
virtualization
DMTCP implements virtualization of filenames as well as pid
names, and so the “open” system call will also be interposed
upon to detect names such as /proc/PID/maps.
In this way, a collection of wrapper functions can be
collected together within a DMTCP plugin library. Such a
library implements a virtualization layer. The ELF library
standard implements a library search order such that symbols
are searched in order as follows:
EXECUTABLE → LIB1 → LIB2 ... LIBC → KERNEL
where the symbol is finally replaced by a direct kernel call.
This sequence can also be viewed as a sequence of layers,
consistent with the common operating system implementation
through layers. A DMTCP plugin for pids then presents a
virtualization layer in which all higher layers see only virtual
pids, and all lower layers see only real pids. This is analogous
to an operating system design in which a higher layer sees
the disk as a filesystem, and a lower layer sees the disk
as a collection of disk blocks. In a similar way, DMTCP
provides layers to virtualize filenames, environment variables
and myriad other names.
In this way, an end user can implement a fault injection
plugin layer such that all code below that layer sees injected
faults, while higher layers do not see the injected faults.
Additionally, such a layer can be instrumented to gather
information such as the cumulative number of faults.
DMTCP also provides an API for the application or a plugin
to either request a checkpoint or to avoid a checkpoint. Upon
checkpoint, each plugin is notified of a checkpoint barrier, and
similarly upon restart. Thus, it is feasible to create successive
checkpoints available for restart or available as a snaphot for
later forensics on the cause of a later error. Optimizations
such as forked checkpointing (fork a child and continue in the
parent) are available in order to take advantage of the kernel’s
copy-on-write in order to make checkpointing/snapshotting
extremely fast.
B. Checkpointing Distributed Resources with the Help of
Barriers
Checkpointing in a distributed application context requires
coordination between multiple processes at different virtual-
ization layers. The use of programmable barriers enables this
coordination. In addition to the checkpoint and restart events,
each plugin (or virtualization layer) can define its own set
barriers and a callback to execute at a barrier. A centralized
DMTCP coordinator forces the application processes to exe-
cute the barriers in sequence.
Further, a hardware resource, for example, the interface to a
hardware emulator, might be shared among multiple processes
that share parent-child relationships. To get a semantically
equivalent state on restart, the barriers can be used to elect
a leader to save and restore the connection to the hardware
emulator on restart.
III. CASE STUDIES ALONG THE WAY TO EXTENDING
DMTCP
This section describes three specific real-world use cases
where DMTCP was extended to support hardware emulation
and simulation software. The examples are motivated by our
work with various hardware and EDA tool vendors.
A. External connections
GUI-based simulation software presents a unique challenge
in checkpointing. The front-end software communicates with
an X server via a socket. The X server runs in a privileged
mode and outside of checkpoint control. While the connection
could be blacklisted for the checkpointing, application’s GUI
context and state is part of the X server and cannot be
checkpointed. The context does not exist at restart time and
needs to be restored. DMTCP was extended to transparently
support checkpointing of VNC [14] and XPRA [15]. The
two tools allow X command forwarding to a local X server
that can be run under checkpoint control. [16] presents an
alternate record-prune-replay based approach using DMTCP
to checkpoint GUI-based applications.
Authentication and license services is an important issue for
protecting the intellectual property of all the parties. Often,
the authentication protocols and software are proprietary and
specific to a vendor. Further, the licensing services are not
run under checkpoint control, which makes it difficult to get a
“complete” checkpoint of the software. Extensions were added
to DMTCP to allow a vendor to hook into the checkpoint and
restart events and mark certain connections as “external” to
the computation. At checkpoint time, the connections marked
external are ignored by DMTCP and instead the responsibility
of restoring these connections is delegated to the vendor-
specific extension. The vendor-specific plugin also allows the
application to check back with the licensing service at restart
time in order to not violate a licensing agreement that restricts
the number of simultaneous “seats”.
B. Virtualizing an application’s environment
The ability to migrate a process among the available re-
sources is critical for efficient utilization of hardware emulator
resources. However, the environment variables, the file paths,
and the files that are saved as part of a checkpoint image make
such migrations challenging. We added DMTCP extensions
(plugins) to virtualize the environment and the file paths.
This allows a process to be restarted on a different system
by changing the values and the paths. Another extension
that we added to DMTCP allows a user to explicitly control
the checkpointing of files used by their application at the
granularity of a single file.
C. Interfacing with hardware and closed-source, third-party
libraries
Hardware emulators communicate with the host software via
high-speed interfaces. Any in-flight transactions at checkpoint
time can result in the data being lost and inconsistent state
on restart. Thus, it is important to bring the system to a
quiescent state and drain the in-flight data on the buses before
saving the state. Further, checkpointing while the software is
in a critical state (like holding a lock on a bus) can lead to
complications on restart. To help mitigate such issues, DMTCP
was extended to allow fine-grained programmatic control over
checkpointing. This enables the hardware/EDA tool vendor
to tailor the checkpointing for their specific requirements. In
particular, it allows a user to invoke checkpointing from within
their code, disable checkpointing for critical sections, or delay
the resuming of user threads until the system reaches a well-
behaved state.
The software toolchain used for simulation and emulation
is often put together by integrating various third-party com-
ponents. The components may be closed-source and may use
proprietary protocols for interfacing with each other and the
system. For example, many software toolchains rely on legacy
32-bit code that’s difficult to port to 64-bits, and so, support for
mixed 32-/64- bit processes was an important consideration.
Checkpointing while holding locks was another interesting
issue. While the locks and their states are a part of the user-
space memory (and hence, a part of the checkpoint image),
an application can also choose to use an error-checking lock
that disallows unlocking by a different thread than the one
that acquired it. On restart, when new thread ids would be
assigned by the system, the locks would become invalid and
the unlock call would fail. We extended DMTCP by adding
wrapper functions for lock acquisition and release functions
to keep track of the state of locks. At restart time, a lock’s
state is patched with the newer thread ids.
More generally, the problem described above is about the
state that’s preserved when a resource is allocated at check-
point time and needs to be deallocated at restart time. While
the restarted process inherits its state from the checkpoint
image, its environment (thread ids, in the above case) might
have changed on restart. An application author with domain
expertise can extend the DMTCP checkpointing framework to
recognize and virtualize these resources. The state could be
a part of the locks that are acquired by a custom thread-safe
malloc library, or the guard regions created by a library to
guard against buffer overflows, or the libraries that are loaded
temporarily.
IV. SURVEY OF EXISTING APPROACHES TO
CHECKPOINTING AND PROCESS VIRTUALIZATION
High performance computing (HPC) is the traditional do-
main in which checkpoint-restart is heavily used. It is used
for the sake of fault tolerance during a long computation, for
example of days. For a survey of checkpoint-restart imple-
mentations in the context of high performance computing, see
Egwutuohaet al. [17]. In the context of HPC, DMTCP and
BLCR [2], [18] are the most widely used examples of trans-
parent, system-level checkpoint-restart parallel computing. (A
transparent checkpointing package is one that does not modify
the target application.)
A. DMTCP
DMTCP (Distributed MultiThreaded CheckPointing) is a
purely user-space implementation. In addition to being trans-
parent, it also does not require any kernel modules and its
installation and execution does not require root privilege or
the use of special Linux capabilities. It achieves its robustness
by trying to stay as close to the POSIX standard as possible
in its API with the Linux kernel.
The first version of DMTCP was later described in [1].
That version did not provide the plugin model for process vir-
tualization. For example, virtualization of network addresses
did not exist, as well as a series of other constructs, such
as timers, session ids, System V shared memory, and other
features. These features were added later due to the require-
ments of high performance computing. Eventually, the current
procedure for virtualizing process ids (see Section II-A was
developed. To the best of our knowledge, DMTCP is unique
in its approach toward process id virtualization.
Eventually, the plugin model was developed, initially for
transparent support of the InfiniBand network fabric [19]. the
current extension of that plugin model is described in [4].
Still later, the requirements for robust support of EDA in
collaboration with Intel led to the development of reduction
of runtime overhead graphic support using XPRA, path virtu-
alization (for virtualization of the runtime slot and associated
directory of a run using a hardware emulator, including
different mount points on the restart computer), virtualization
of environment variables including the X-Windows DISPLAY
variable (for similar reasons), robustness across a variety
of older and newer Linux kernels and GNU libc versions,
mixed multi-architecture (32- and 64-bit) processes within a
single computation, low-overhead support for malloc-intensive
programs, re-connection of a socket to a license server on
restart, and whitelist and blacklist of special temporary files
that many or may not be present on the restart computer.
B. BLCR
BLCR supports only single-node standalone checkpointing.
In particular, it does not support checkpointing of TCP sockets,
InfiniBand connections, open files, or SysV shared memory
objects.
BLCR is often used in HPC clusters, where one has full
control over the choice of Linux kernel and other systems
software. Typically, a Linux kernel is chosen that is compatible
with BLCR, a BLCR kernel module is installed, and when
it is time to checkpoint, it is the responsibility of an MPI
checkpoint-restart service to temporarily disconnected the MPI
network layer, then checkpoint locally on each node, and
finally re-connect the MPI network layer.
Note that BLCR is limited in what features it supports,
notably including a lack of support for sockets and System V
shared memory. Quoting from the BLCR User’s Guide:
“However, certain applications are not supported
because they use resources not restored by BLCR:
. . . Applications which use sockets (regardless of ad-
dress family). . . .; Applications which use character
or block devices (e.g. serial ports or raw partitions).
. . .; Applications which use System V IPC mech-
anisms including shared memory, semaphores and
message queues.” [20]
The lack of BLCR support for shared memory also prevents
its use in OpenSHMEM [21].
C. ZapC and CRUZ
ZapC and CRUZ represent two other checkpointing ap-
proaches that are not currently widely used.
ZapC [22] and CRUZ [23] were earlier efforts to support
distributed checkpointing, by modifying the kernel to inserting
hooks into the network stack using netfilter to translate source
and destination addresses. ZapC and CRUZ are no longer
in active use. They were designed to virtualize primarily
two resources: process ids and IP network addresses. They
did not support SSH, InfiniBand, System V IPC, or POSIX
timers, all of which are commonly used in modern software
implementation.
D. CRIU
CRIU [3] leverages Linux namespaces for transparently
checkpointing on a single host (often within a Linux con-
tainer), but lacks support for distributed computations. In-
stead of directly virtualizing the process id, CRIU relies
on extending the kernel API through a much larger proc
filesystem and a greatly extended “prctl” system call. For
example, the “PR_SET_MM” has 13 additional parameters
that can be set (e.g., beginning end end of text, data, and
stack). In another example, CRIU relies on the “CON-
FIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE” kernel configuration to al-
low a process to directly modify the kernel’s choice of pid for
the next process to be created [24]. In a general context, there
is a danger that the desired pid to be restored may already
be occupied by another process, but CRIU is also often used
within a container where this restriction can be avoided.
Finally, CRIU has a more specialized plugin facility [25].
Some examples are: ability to save and restore the contents
of particular files; and the means to save and restore pointers
to external sockets, external links, and mount points that are
outside the filesystem namespace of an LXC (Linux Con-
tainer). Recall that CRIU does not try to support distributed
computations. Perhaps it is for this reason that CRIU did
not have the same pressure to develop a broader plugin
system capable of supporting generic external devices such
as hardware emulators.
E. Process Virtualization
The term process virtualization was used in [26]. That work
discusses kernel-level support for such process virtualization,
while the current work emphasizes an entirely user-space
approach within unprivileged processes. Related to process
virtualization is the concept of a Library OS, exemplified
by the Drawbridge Library OS [27] and Exokernel [28].
However, such systems are concerned with providing extended
or modified system services that are not natively present in the
underlying operating system kernel.
Both process-level virtualization and the Library OS ap-
proach employ a user-space approach (ideally with no mod-
ification to the application executable, and no additional
privileges required). However, a Library OS is concerned
with providing extended or modified system services that
are not natively present in the underlying operating system
kernel. Process virtualization is concerned with providing a
semantically equivalent system object using the same system
service. This need arises when restarting from a checkpoint
image, or when carrying out a live process migration from
one computer to another. The target computer host is assumed
to provide the same system services as were available on the
original host.
Although process-level virtualization and a Library OS both
operate in user space without special privileges, the goal of
a Library OS is quite different. A Library OS modifies or
extends the system services provided by the operating system
kernel. For example, Drawbridge [27] presents a Windows 7
personality, so as to run Windows 7 applications under newer
versions of Windows. Similarly, the original exokernel operat-
ing system [28] provided additional operating system services
beyond those of a small underlying operating system kernel,
and this was argued to often be more efficient that a larger
kernel directly providing those services.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to develop a successful plugin model for check-
pointing in the context of EDA, one required modularity that
enabled the DMTCP team, Intel, and Mentor Graphics to each
write their own modular code. Further, the Intel and Mentor
Graphics DMTCP-based plugins and other code were of
necessity proprietary. This work has shown how the DMTCP
plugin model can be used to provide a flexible model enabling
full cooperation, while avoiding the more extreme roadmaps
of either fully application-specific code or transparent, system-
level checkpointing with no knowledge of the proprietary
aspects of the Mentor Graphics hardware emulator.
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